The bombed out vehicle that was carrying Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi. Wanndy’s death indirectly capped Malaysia’s Special Branch success in disrupting several terrorist plots by the Islamic State. FILE PIC

THE death of Muhammad Wanndy Mohamed Jedi is expected to strengthen the disruption of several terrorist plots in Malaysia by the self-styled Islamic State. While the radicalisation and recruitment of IS members are due to many factors, one key driver has been the presence of recruiters online. Until his death, Wanndy had been a prominent recruiter of support for his threats against the country.

Wanndy’s death indirectly capped Malaysia’s Special Branch success in disrupting several terrorist plots by IS. More than 250 IS members and supporters have been arrested in Malaysia over the past five years, notably since the growing prominence of IS in the Syria conflict.

The 26-year-old Wanndy travelled to Syria with his pregnant wife in January 2015. He had narrated on his social media account that he had made the travel through Butterworth and then to Thailand, Turkey and eventually Syria. Wanndy had been an online supporter even before he migrated to Syria.

However, he was identified in early 2015 after he appeared in a 30-second video where he was seen smiling whilst holding the head of a beheaded IS victim. Since then, his supporters had been following him online via his several online monikers which included “Abu Hamzah al Fateh”, “Abu Sayyaf al Malizi” and “Wakasilu Huruhara”.

Wanndy and his wife were active on social media. They shared their life stories in IS territories and propagated the IS ideology to justify their actions. They portrayed life with IS as one filled with blessings, often posting heartwarming pictures of their family and friends, showing camaraderie among IS members.

With their supporters, they appeared warm and friendly. With his adversaries, Wanndy was aggressive. He released threats and showed off his military skills. He was always updated on counter-terrorist developments in Malay-sia.

As the mastermind behind the Movida attack in Puchong, Selangor in June 2016, Wanndy was first to announce the perpetrators to be two members from the “Junud Khilafah Wilayah Malizia”.

Both attackers were arrested and sentenced to 25 years’ jail. Further investigations show that Wanndy was involved in several other IS cells in Malaysia including the “Al-Qubro Generation” and “Kumpulan Gagak Hitam”. Other reports likened him to IS Indonesian militant in Syria, Bahrun Naim, and suggested that they were working together to network operatives in Malaysia and Indonesia. Such cooperation would assist in the travels of militants. Both were purported to be part of IS’ external operations unit responsible for attacks outside of IS territories.

When news of Wanndy’s death first seeped into the jihadi online community, his supporters sought his wife’s words for confirmation. She announced on April 30 that the news was credible. She explained that she had identified Wanndy’s body herself. While his supporters were quick to accept the news as it was told, Malaysian authorities were doubtful initially.

No picture of Wanndy’s body was released. There were speculation that he might have staged his own death with the plan to return to Malaysia and escape being targeted by American drones. This is especially so after he was listed as the “most wanted” terrorist by the United States in early April.

There were also reports of him siphoning off money from Malaysian operatives and of him having trouble with the IS leadership because of the absence of a successful attack in Malaysia.

Confirmation of his death on May 8, though, does not completely banish the expanding IS network in Malaysia. The IS ideology has spread, providing fertile ground for a replacement of recruiters and coordinators. They could be located in IS territories like Wanndy or even on home ground.

From Syria to Iraq, it is hard to predict his successor. Reportedly, many Malaysians in IS territories have died in battle. Those believed to be alive have been absent online for at least a year. These include Malaysians known online as “Fudhail Omar”, “Akel Zainal” and “Zahar”. Known as the “cook”, “drummer” and “former Malaysian soldier” respectively, they have been in Syria since 2014 and 2015. They were once very active, having thousands of followers online. Their tapering presence online started in 2015 when social media companies started shutting down their accounts. This raised concerns as to whether they are now operating on encrypted communication platforms.

The Malaysians in IS territories who are online today are wives of IS militants. They show no aggressive approach to recruit or radicalise and use the online platform more as an online diary where they jot their thoughts and emotions. However, this does not rule out their capabilities for active participation.

The case of Malaysian “Dr Shams”, has shown how women can be effective recruiters. In 2014 and 2015, “Dr Shams” manned her own blog where she shared tips on how to travel to Syria, to inquiring radicalised individuals. On home ground, avid IS supporters and Wanndy’s fans too, represent a pool of individuals who could be inspired to fill in his shoes in their strife to continue their perceived battle.

The key challenge today is in keeping up with the communication platforms recruiters and supporters are using. The last five years have allowed these like-minded individuals to find each other via open and public communication platforms such as social media. Today, our adversaries have largely moved on to encrypted platforms and possibly, even the real-world.

Terrorists know no geographical boundaries or limitations in their operations. This is seen in their inter-linkages such as those in terrorist groups in this region. Their networks are global, their target audience transcends communities from different fields and industries, and their communication exploits all means available today and tomorrow.

The multi-pronged approach very much called for in the fight against terrorism is urgently needed. However, this multi-pronged approach can only be attained through inter-agency cooperation which has real challenges. Political milieu and different interests of states, political parties, security, technology and communication agencies are among our barriers to working together. Until we push for a change, our weaknesses remain our adversary’s playing field.

The writer is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

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